The law is an extremely complex phenomenon. It is very difficult to determine it precisely as the complete comprehension and ultimate definition of the law are beyond human capabilities. Also, the law never coincides with its concept, nor does the concept of the law coincide with its definition. This fact shows that the real human capabilities for the comprehension, determination and definition of the law are very limited and the limits are unreliable. The concept of the law is relative as (...) well, which is why all the definitions of the law are also relative. The concept and the definition of the law are also relative because they are of necessity subjective. It is for this reason that they are never truthful. However, even when they are not truthful, they are always useful. Because of these essential cognitive shortcomings and limitations, the law is determined and defined realistically – in a conventional and operative manner – whenever it is possible to do so. Additional difficulties are created by the fact that the number of conventional concepts and definitions of the law is almost limitless. Fortunately, only a number of them, considered operative, are used in the law. And all this because of a possible usefulness. Should the law be useful, then its realistic concept can be determined by the establishment of its common characteristics. On the basis of having at its disposal the mentioned common characteristics, the concept of the law can be operationally determined in both the expanded sense and the restricted sense. Also, it is possible to tell the difference between the three main layers in the concept of the law: complete , incomplete and unfinished law. Obviously, the realistically determined concept of the law is not one-sided, nor is it monolithic, but complex, detailed and as a whole composed of layers of different degrees of being legal. They are used to finely tune the ordering of the relationships between different importance and the degree of the conflict and, which is also important, to legally regulate even those social areas that would otherwise be exclusively regulated with the state or with the social norms. Otherwise, even the Ten Commandments alone would be insufficient to regulate all human relationships. However, the law did not come into being out of leisure time, but out of dire human need to protect the society from self-destruction. Contrary to the realistic concept of the law, there also exist its idealistic, idealized and ideal concepts. However, the idealistic concept of the law is inoperative, the idealized concept of the law is not correct, while the ideal concept of the law is out of human reach.Das Recht stellt ein immens vielfältiges Phänomen dar. Ihn präzise festzulegen entpuppt sich als unsäglich schwierig, denn eine lückenlose Erkenntnis sowie endgültige Definition des Rechts liegt jenseits des menschlichen Vermögens. Zudem geht weder das Recht mit dessen Begriff konform, noch tut es der Begriff des Rechts mit eigener Bestimmung. Dieser Tatbestand lässt durchblicken, die wahre menschliche Befähigung zum Erkennen, Determinieren sowie Definieren des Rechts sei höchst begrenzt, wobei sich ebendiese Schranken als unzuverlässig erzeigen. Die Notion des Rechts ist ebenso relativ, weswegen hiernach sämtliche Begriffsbestimmungen des Rechts relativ sind. Der Begriff einschließlich der Definition des Rechts ist auch aufgrund der ihnen notwendigerweise innewohnenden Subjektivität relativ. Aus diesem Grund sind sie niemals wahrheitsgetreu. Allerdings, auch wenn sie der Wahrheit nicht entsprechen, sind sie stets von Nützlichkeit. Wegen der angebrachten essenziellen erkenntnismäßigen Unzulänglichkeiten und Limitierungen wird das Recht realistisch bestimmt und definiert – in einer konventionellen bzw. operativen Manier – wann immer dies durchführbar ist. Zusätzliche Erschwernisse werden von der Tatsache geschaffen, dass die Zahl der gebräuchlichen Begriffe und Definitionen des Rechts schier unermesslich ist. Glücklicherweise werden lediglich etliche, als operativ angesehene, im Bereich von Recht eingesetzt. Und all dies der denkbaren Nützlichkeit halber. Sollte das Recht nützlich sein, dann lässt sich dessen realistischer Begriff per Gründung seiner gemeinsamen Wesenszüge festsetzen. Auf der Basis der vorhin angeschnittenen, ihm zu Gebote stehenden angehörigen Merkmale, kann der Begriff des Rechts operational determiniert werden, sowohl im erweiterten als auch im engeren Sinne. Ebenfalls ist der Unterschied erkennbar zwischen drei Hauptschichten in dem Begriff des Rechts: vollständiges Recht , unvollständiges Recht und unvollendetes Recht . Augenscheinlich ist der realistischerweise bestimmte Begriff des Rechts weder einseitig noch monolithisch, stattdessen ist er komplex, detailliert und als Ganzes aus Schichten von ungleichem Rechtlichkeitsgrad zusammengestellt. Man gebraucht sie zur Feinabstimmung der Beziehungsordnung zwischen der unterschiedlichen Wichtigkeit und dem Grad des Konflikts, und, was genauso Gewicht hat, um sogar jene Gesellschaftszonen rechtmäßig zu regeln, die anderenfalls ausschließlich seitens der staatlichen bzw. gesellschaftlichen Normen geregelt würden. Ansonsten würden selbst die Zehn Gebote nicht genügen, um menschliche Verhältnisse in ihrer Gänze zu ordnen. Jedoch ist das Recht nicht als Freizeitaktivität entstanden, sondern im Gegenteil als unentbehrliches menschliches Bedürfnis nach Bewahrung der Menschheit vor Selbstauflösung. Der realistischen Notion des Rechts entgegengesetzt existieren parallel dessen idealistische, idealisierte und ideale Begriffe. Dabei gilt der idealistische Begriff als inoperativ, der idealisierte als inkorrekt, während der ideale Begriff außerhalb der menschlichen Reichweite liegt. (shrink)

The present study aims to identify contextual and psychological factors of proneness to radicalization and violent extremism operationalized through the Militant Extremist Mindset scale consisting of three distinct aspects: Proviolence, Vile World beliefs, and trust in Divine Power. A community sample of 271 high school students from Belgrade and Sandžak regions in Serbia completed: a 24-item MEM scale; contextual measures including a 6-item scale of family dysfunction and a 4-item composite measure capturing exposure to a harsh school environment and peer (...) abuse ; psychological measures including the 9-item Right-Wing Authoritarianism scale, the 5-item Social Dominance Orientation scale, and the 20-item UCLA Loneliness scale. A path analysis was conducted with contextual factors on the first and psychological factors on the second level of the model predicting the three factors of MEM. LON was positively predicted by FDys and HSE, SDO by HSE only, while RWA was positively predicted by FDys only. Contextual and psychological factors accounted for 27% of the variance in PV, 15% of the variance in VW, and 31% of the variance in DP. Obtained findings reveal a complex interplay of contextual and psychological drivers in the prediction of different aspects of RVE and build upon existing knowledge on risk factors associated with RVE. (shrink)

In this paper, we present a method for introducing law students to the writing of legal documents. The method uses a machine-readable representation of the legal knowledge to support document assembly and to help the students to understand how the assembly is performed. The knowledge base consists of enacted legislation, document templates, and assembly instructions. We propose a system called LEDAS (LEgal Document Assembly System) for the interactive assembly of legal documents. It guides users through the assembly process and provides (...) explanations of the interconnection between input data and claims stated in the document. The system acts as a platform for practicing drafting skills and has great potential as an education tool. It allows teachers to configure the system for the assembly of some particular type of legal document and then enables students to draft the documents by investigating which information is relevant for these documents and how the input data shape the final document. The generated legal document is complemented by a graphical representation of legal arguments expressed in the document. The system is based on existing legal standards to facilitate its introduction in the legal domain. Applicability of the system in the education of future lawyers is positively evaluated by the group of law students and their TA. (shrink)

Aristotle was the founder not only of logic but also of modal logic. In the Prior Analytics he developed a complex system of modal syllogistic which, while influential, has been disputed since antiquity--and is today widely regarded as incoherent. Combining analytic rigor with keen sensitivity to historical context, Marko Malink makes clear that the modal syllogistic forms a consistent, integrated system of logic, one that is closely related to other areas of Aristotle's philosophy. Aristotle's modal syllogistic differs significantly from (...) modern modal logic. Malink considers the key to understanding the Aristotelian version to be the notion of predication discussed in the Topics--specifically, its theory of predicables and the ten categories. The predicables introduce a distinction between essential and nonessential predication. In contrast, the categories distinguish between substantial and nonsubstantial predication. Malink builds on these insights in developing a semantics for Aristotle's modal propositions, one that verifies the ancient philosopher's claims of the validity and invalidity of modal inferences. While it acknowledges some limitations of this reconstruction, Aristotle's Modal Syllogistic brims with bold ideas, richly supported by close readings of the Greek texts. (shrink)

This chapter serves as an introduction to the book, offering a description of problems in Lockean scholarship, the book's overall argument and approach, and more. Locke scholarship tends to be compartmentalized, which is problematic since Locke was a systematic polymath. Scholarship also tends to over-simplify the intense debates in which Locke found himself. Furthermore, scholars typically fail to make a distinction between Locke's programmatic and personal views. As a result of these tendencies, some label Locke as heterodox, others as orthodox, (...) and still others try to identify him as defending a particular sect, all depending on the narrative or issue the scholar is exploring. Most Lockean scholars approach him as being religiously surreptitious, sectarian, or sincere. This book adds to the voices that think Locke was forthright in his writings. This chapter also articulates the thesis for the entire book and the theses and coherence of the following chapters. (shrink)

In this essay, I argue that Robert Boyle does not hold that true religion requires us to believe doctrines that are in violation of the law of noncontradiction or that it yields logical contradictions. Rather, due to the epistemological limitations of human reason, we are sometimes called to believe doctrines or propositions that are at first blush contradictory but, upon further inspection, not definitively so. This holds for doctrines considered singly or together and is an important qualifier to the traditional (...) line of scholarship’s flat claim that Boyle’s limits of belief are logical contradictions. My conclusions here are at odds with Jan W. Wojcik’s claim, in her important, revisionist work on the famous natural philosopher, that he teaches that sometimes we are required to believe religious doctrines that violate the law of noncontradiction. (shrink)

It is my contention here that the chapter “Of Power,” in John Locke’s An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, is not a metaphysical pronouncement upon the liberty-necessity debates but more along the lines of what those like James Harris portray it to be: a description of our experience of freedom of the will. It is also prescriptive since it is descriptive of the right use of the will. My claims are based upon two key pieces of evidence that are responses to (...) William Molyneux’s oft noted critique of the first edition of the chapter: 1) an admission by Locke in his correspondence: at least part of the reason he is attempting to avoid metaphysical pronouncements is that trying to reconcile divine and human agency is too difficult; and 2) the theological message of “Of Power”—the truly free agent is reasonable, and the truly reasonable agent will have her eyes fixed on the afterlife, thus aiming for herself to be a slave and determined, therefore, by her ever-cultivated desire for righteousness and not by her fleshly desires—and his development of it throughout the chapter eludes sectarian categorization by the avoidance of theological issues that are not unrelated to the metaphysical question of human free agency. To frame his chapter otherwise makes him out to be a theological novice or, perhaps, unconcerned with the religious background of his readership. (shrink)

This essay argues that Locke’s presentation of justification and the soteriological framework in which it is placed in The Reasonableness of Christianity is broad enough to encompass all “Christian” views on the topics except antinomian ones. In other words, the focus of the treatise is not Locke’s personal views of justification and the broader doctrine of salvation but an ecumenical statement of them. Locke’s personal conclusions on certain theological issues discussed in the opening pages of The Reasonableness of Christianity has (...) led most to assume that the soteriological discussion that follows reveals Locke’s own personal theological position despite clear indications of his ecumenical intent in The Reasonableness of Christianity and elsewhere. (shrink)

This paper considers the question of whether the influential distinction between levels of explanation introduced by David Marr can be used as a general framework for contemplating levels of explanation in cognitive sciences. Marr introduced three levels at which we can explain cognitive processes: the computational, algorithmic, and implementational levels. Some argue that Marr’s levels of explanation can only be applied to modular cognitive systems. However, since many psychological processes are non-modular, it seems that Marr’s levels of explanation cannot explain (...) such psychological processes. To show that the latter claim is not convincing, the paper draws upon an influential paradigm from cognitive sciences that is based on the principle of free energy. Based on this paradigm, the paper argues that even non-modular psychological processes can be computationally analyzed and algorithmically implemented. The conclusion of the paper is that, at least under the assumption that the func- tion of the mind is to minimize free energy, Marr’s levels of explanation can be successfully used as a general framework for understanding psychological processes at different levels of description. (shrink)

In this essay, I argue that Robert Boyle does not hold that true religion requires us to believe doctrines that are in violation of the law of noncontradictionor that it yields logical contradictions. Rather, due to the epistemological limitations of human reason, we are sometimes called to believe doctrines orpropositions that are at first blush contradictory but, upon further inspection, not definitively so. This holds for doctrines considered singly or together and is animportant qualifier to the traditional line of scholarship’s (...) flat claim that Boyle’s limits of belief are logical contradictions. My conclusions here are at odds withJan W. Wojcik’s claim, in her important, revisionist work on the famous natural philosopher, that he teaches that sometimes we are required to believe religiousdoctrines that violate the law of noncontradiction. (shrink)

In this article I argue that the 1729 Dissertation on Liberty and Neces­sity should be attributed to Anthony Collins. This was the prevailing view until the publication of James O’Higgins’s 1970 biography of Collins. Since then, most have followed Collins’s modern-day biographer in denying that Collins penned the Dissertation. After reviewing O’Higgins’s six reasons for rejecting Collins as the author, I respond to the substantive issues in what follows. Part I is a historical positioning of the Clarke-Collins liberty-necessity debate where (...) I discuss the debate’s context, Collins’s methods and disposition, and timeline issues pertinent to ascribing authorship of the Dissertation to Collins. Part II is a demonstration of the fittingness of the Dissertation as Collins’s response to the earlier debate regarding liberty and necessity he had with Samuel Clarke. (shrink)

In response to Albrecht et al.’s (J Agric Environ Ethics 26(4):827–845, 2013) discussion on the ethics of assisted migration, we emphasize the issues of risk and scientific uncertainty as an inextricable part of a comprehensive ethical evaluation. Insisting on a separation of risk and ethical considerations, although arguably common in many policy contexts, is at best misguided and at worst damaging.

This paper concerns the apparent fact — discussed by Sinan Dogramaci and Brian Weatherson — that inductive reasoning often interacts in disastrous ways with patterns of reasoning that seem perfectly fine in the deductive case. In contrast to Dogramaci's and Weatherson's own suggestions, I argue that these cases show that we cannot reason inductively about arbitrary objects. Moreover, as I argue, this prohibition is neatly explained by a certain hypothesis about the rational basis of inductive reasoning — namely, the hypothesis (...) that inductive reasoning is fundamentally reasoning about what normally happens. (shrink)

Ever since Bishop Stillingfleet accused John Locke of having unwittingly paved the way with his Essay for the alleged heresy promulgated in John Toland's Christianity Not Mysterious, the latter two thinkers and works have been consistently joined in histories of philosophy covering the rise of natural religion in England. While scholars have generally thought that Locke got the better of the good bishop in their subsequent written exchanges initiated by the charge, they appear merely to assume that Stillingfleet correctly read (...) Toland and that Locke accepts that reading. Perhaps the most obvious piece of evidence favoring that stance is that while Locke clearly admits "above reason" doctrines, Toland dismisses them: Christianity is not mysterious! It is curious, however, that Toland scholars readily point out many concepts that Toland used as being the same as or different from Lockean notions about which many Locke scholars are admittedly perplexed. Through patient exposition of relevant texts and letters, deconstruction of scholarly works, and careful reasoning, this book shows that Toland's deviations from Locke regarding reason and faith are far more minor than anyone has concluded. Stillingfleet was correct to connect them, but was incorrect in the way that he did it. (shrink)

In this article I argue that the 1729 Dissertation on Liberty and Neces­sity should be attributed to Anthony Collins. This was the prevailing view until the publication of James O’Higgins’s 1970 biography of Collins. Since then, most have followed Collins’s modern-day biographer in denying that Collins penned the Dissertation. After reviewing O’Higgins’s six reasons for rejecting Collins as the author, I respond to the substantive issues in what follows. Part I is a historical positioning of the Clarke-Collins liberty-necessity debate where (...) I discuss the debate’s context, Collins’s methods and disposition, and timeline issues pertinent to ascribing authorship of the Dissertation to Collins. Part II is a demonstration of the fittingness of the Dissertation as Collins’s response to the earlier debate regarding liberty and necessity he had with Samuel Clarke. (shrink)

Corruption involves greed, money, and risky decision-making. We explore the love of money, pay satisfaction, probability of risk, and dishonesty across cultures. Avaricious monetary aspiration breeds unethicality. Prospect theory frames decisions in the gains-losses domain and high-low probability. Pay dissatisfaction (in the losses domain) incites dishonesty in the name of justice at the individual level. The Corruption Perceptions Index, CPI, signals a high-low probability of getting caught for dishonesty at the country level. We theorize that decision-makers adopt avaricious love-of-money aspiration (...) as a lens and frame dishonesty in the gains-losses domain (pay satisfaction-dissatisfaction, Level 1) and high-low probability (CPI, Level 2) to maximize expected utility and ultimate serenity. We challenge the myth: Pay satisfaction mitigates dishonesty across nations consistently. Based on 6500 managers in 32 countries, our cross-level three-dimensional visualization offers the following discoveries. Under high aspiration conditions, pay dissatisfaction excites the highest- (third-highest) avaricious justice-seeking dishonesty in high (medium) CPI nations, supporting the certainty effect. However, pay satisfaction provokes the second-highest avaricious opportunity-seizing dishonesty in low CPI entities, sustaining the possibility effect—maximizing expected utility. Under low aspiration conditions, high pay satisfaction consistently leads to low dishonesty, demonstrating risk aversion—achieving ultimate serenity. We expand prospect theory from a micro and individual-level theory to a cross-level theory of monetary wisdom across 32 nations. We enhance the S-shaped Curve to three 3-D corruption surfaces across three levels of the global economic pyramid, providing novel insights into behavioral economics, business ethics, the environment, and responsibility. (shrink)

Monetary intelligence theory asserts that individuals apply their money attitude to frame critical concerns in the context and strategically select certain options to achieve financial goals and ultimate happiness. This study explores the dark side of monetary Intelligence and behavioral economics—dishonesty. Dishonesty, a risky prospect, involves cost–benefit analysis of self-interest. We frame good or bad barrels in the environmental context as a proxy of high or low probability of getting caught for dishonesty, respectively. We theorize: The magnitude and intensity of (...) the relationship between love of money and dishonest prospect may reveal how individuals frame dishonesty in the context of two levels of subjective norm—perceived corporate ethical values at the micro-level and Corruption Perceptions Index at the macro-level, collected from multiple sources. Based on 6382 managers in 31 geopolitical entities across six continents, our cross-level three-way interaction effect illustrates: As expected, managers in good barrels, mixed barrels, and bad barrels display low, medium, and high magnitude of dishonesty, respectively. With high CEV, the intensity is the same across cultures. With low CEV, the intensity of dishonesty is the highest in high CPI entities —the Enron Effect, but the lowest in low CPI entities. CPI has a strong impact on the magnitude of dishonesty, whereas CEV has a strong impact on the intensity of dishonesty. We demonstrate dishonesty in light of monetary values and two frames of social norm, revealing critical implications to the field of behavioral economics and business ethics. (shrink)

Derrida has been interpreted as a nihilist and relativist. This study demonstrates that he has an ethics and a concern for religion that goes beyond the structures of the philosophical tradition.

The philosophical literature on reasoning is dominated by the assumption that reasoning is essentially a matter of following rules. This paper challenges this view, by arguing that it misrepresents the nature of reasoning as a personal level activity. Reasoning must reflect the reasoner’s take on her evidence. The rule-following model seems ill-suited to accommodate this fact. Accordingly, this paper suggests replacing the rule-following model with a different, semantic approach to reasoning.

Monetary Intelligence theory asserts that individuals apply their money attitude to frame critical concerns in the context and strategically select certain options to achieve financial goals and ultimate happiness. This study explores the bright side of Monetary Intelligence and behavioral economics, frames money attitude in the context of pay and life satisfaction, and controls money at the macro-level and micro-level. We theorize: Managers with low love of money motive but high stewardship behavior will have high subjective well-being: pay satisfaction and (...) quality of life. Data collected from 6586 managers in 32 cultures across six continents support our theory. Interestingly, GDP per capita is related to life satisfaction, but not to pay satisfaction. Individual income is related to both life and pay satisfaction. Neither GDP nor income is related to Happiness. Our theoretical model across three GDP groups offers new discoveries: In high GDP entities, “high income” not only reduces aspirations—“Rich, Motivator, and Power,” but also promotes stewardship behavior—“Budget, Give/Donate, and Contribute” and appreciation of “Achievement.” After controlling income, we demonstrate the bright side of Monetary Intelligence: Low love of money motive but high stewardship behavior define Monetary Intelligence. “Good apples enjoy good quality of life in good barrels.” This notion adds another explanation to managers’ low magnitude of dishonesty in entities with high Corruption Perceptions Index. In low GDP entities, high income is related to poor Budgeting skills and escalated Happiness. These managers experience equal satisfaction with pay and life. We add a new vocabulary to the conversation of monetary intelligence, income, GDP, happiness, subjective well-being, good and bad apples and barrels, corruption, and behavioral ethics. (shrink)

This article aims to show that it is impossible to put Cicero’s testimonies regarding The Fabius Argument in a consistent inferential order. Either we must suppose that additional premises are tacitly assumed in the text or we must com-pare it with other sources, which leads to inconsistencies in the proof’s reconstruction. Cicero’s reconstruction of the progression of the argument has formal shortcomings, and the paper draws attention to some of these deficiencies. He interpreted sources in a revised and intentionally simplified (...) way, with the aim of undermining the views of his opponents, casting them as inconsistent and similar to views held by Diodorus. Rather than being a consistently interpreted argument faithfully transcribed from the Stoic sources, Cicero’s Fabius Argument is ultimately anti-Stoic. (shrink)

Background and Aims: The COVID-19 pandemic has led to radical and unexpected changes in everyday life, and it is plausible that people’s psychophysical health has been affected. This study examined the relationship between COVID-19 related knowledge and mental health in a Croatian sample of participants.MethodsAn online survey was conducted from March 18 until March 23, 2020, and a total of 1244 participant responses were collected. Measures included eight questions regarding biological features of the virus, symptoms, and prevention, the Hospital Anxiety (...) and Depression Scale, and Optimism-Pessimism Scale. According to the answers given on the questions on COVID-19 related knowledge, participants were divided in two groups: informed and uninformed on each question. They were then compared in the expressed levels of anxiety, depression, pessimism, and optimism. Full vs. partial mediation models with optimism/pessimism as a mediator in the relationship between anxiety/depression and the accuracy of responses for questions about handwashing and ways of transmission were estimated.ResultsParticipants who responded correctly on the question about handwashing had higher levels of anxiety, depression, and pessimism than those participants whose answer was incorrect, while participants who answered correctly on the question about the percentage of patients who develop serious breathing problems had higher levels of depression than those who answered incorrectly. Lower levels of anxiety and pessimism were observed in the participants who answered correctly about ways of transmission. Higher levels of pessimism were found in participants who scored incorrectly on questions about the efficiency of antibiotics, most common symptoms, and the possibility of being infected by asymptomatic carriers. Higher levels of knowledge about handwashing were predicted by higher levels of anxiety and pessimism. Higher levels of knowledge about ways of transmission were predicted by lower levels of anxiety and lower levels of pessimism. The examined relationships between anxiety/depression and knowledge were mediated by pessimism.ConclusionThe findings of this study suggest that knowledge about COVID-19 may be useful to reduce anxiety and depression, but it must be directed to the promotion of health behaviors and to the recognition of fake news. (shrink)

Both G.F.W. Hegel and Carl Schmitt took seriously the problem of political sovereignty entailed by liberal political theories. In Dictatorship (1919) and Political Theology (1922), Schmitt rejects liberal political theories that argue for the immediate unity of democracy and legality i.e., popular sovereignty, because he thinks they cannot secure political sovereignty. In the Philosophy of Right, Hegel denounces popular sovereignty for similar reasons. Yet given Schmitt’s negative assessment of Hegel their positions are seldom related to one another. I argue in (...) this paper that Schmitt’s analysis of liberal political theories is similar to Hegel’s analysis of Rousseau’s liberal ideas. I contend, however, that Schmitt’s solution, which collapses the distinction between the executive and the legislative power in favor of the former, fails to secure political sovereignty. Contrary to Schmitt, Hegel conceives of the liberal predicament as a basic determination of any political state that rests on the division of the legislative and executive power. Hegel argues that the constitutional monarchy is a genuine instantiation of political sovereignty that can maintain not only the division of these powers, but also their unity. In this regard, I argue that Hegel’s conception of the division of powers provides a more convincing theory of the problem afflicting modern states than Schmitt’s and at least deserves to be taken more seriously by critics of Schmitt’s solution such as Hannah Arendt, Leo Strauss, Jurgen Habermas, Andreas Kalyvas and Chantal Mouffe. (shrink)

We provide a novel Bayesian justification of inference to the best explanation. More specifically, we present conditions under which explanatory considerations can provide a significant confirmatory boost for hypotheses that provide the best explanation of the relevant evidence. Furthermore, we show that the proposed Bayesian model of IBE is able to deal naturally with the best known criticisms of IBE such as van Fraassen?s?bad lot? argument.

Discussions of Ryle’s regress argument against the “intellectualist legend” have largely focused on whether it is effective against a certain view about knowledge how, namely, the view that knowledge how is a species of propositional knowledge. This is understandable, as this is how Ryle himself framed the issue. Nevertheless, this focus has tended to obscure some different concerns which are no less pressing—either for Ryle or for us today. More specifically, I argue that a version of Ryle’s regress confronts any (...) view according to which the intelligence manifested in action must be inherited from purely inner mental causes. I recommend an alternative account of the metaphysics of intelligent action, which avoids this commitment. (shrink)

Even if you believe just what you rationally ought to believe, you may be open to rational criticism if you do so ‘for the wrong reasons’, as we say. Some have thought that this familiar observation supports the idea that there are diachronic norms of epistemic rationality – namely, norms of good reasoning. Partly drawing upon Carroll's story of Achilles and the Tortoise, this article criticises this line of thought on the grounds that it rests on a mistaken conception of (...) inference. (shrink)

Explaining the emergence of life is perhaps central and the most challenging question in modern science. Within this area of research, the emergence and evolution of the genetic code is supposed to be a critical transition in the evolution of modern organisms. The canonical genetic code is one of the most dominant aspects of life on this planet, and thus studying its origin is critical to understanding the evolution of life, including life’s emergence. In this sense it is possible to (...) view the ribosome as a digital-to-analogue information converter. Why the translation apparatus evolved, is one of the enduring mysteries of molecular biology. Assuming the hypothesis that during the emergence of life evolution had to first involve autocatalytic systems, which only subsequently acquired the capacity of genetic heredity, in the present article we discuss some aspects and causes of the possible emergence of digital, discrete information arising from analogue information realized in the intra- and inter-molecular interactions throughout molecular evolution. How such reverse translation was achieved at a molecular level is still unclear. The results of such debates and investigations might shift current biological paradigms and might also have a momentous significance for modern philosophy in understanding our place in the universe. (shrink)

As noted in the Report of the Central Committee of the CPSU to the Twenty-Fourth Party Congress, presented by the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU, Comrade L. I. Brezhnev, the economy is taking on an entirely new scale of operations at the present stage. The basis of our economic power is coming to be industry with its numerous branches and a socialist agriculture organized on a large scale, advanced science, and skilled corps of workers, experts in (...) technology, and managers. Incomparably higher levels of the economy, of socialist social relationships, of culture, and of the consciousness of the broad masses of the workers are being attained. All this enables us today to set and attain objectives we could not have dreamed of at earlier stages in the building of socialism. (shrink)

Building on Friedrich A. Hayek’s work in social philosophy, the paper gives an account of the central role of ignorance in institutional epistemology. The first part of the paper argues that if individuals involved in the search for knowledge are constitutionally ignorant and guided by norms, as Hayek saw them, they are more likely to attain knowledge if they follow different norms, including those that are redundant. The second part of the paper argues that the market as an institutional arrangement, (...) preferred by Hayek for its epistemic features, may lead to an epistemically detrimental reduction of agents following redundant norms. (shrink)

In his long-awaited book On What Matters Parfit develops a normative theory that covers a whole range of normative concepts, from reasons and rationality to questions of moral progress and meaning of life. This paper focuses on Parfit*s view on reasons and rationality, and especially concentrates on three theses that are implicitly or explicitly endorsed by Parfit. The theses are: 1) the concept of a normative reason cannot be explicated in a non-circular way, 2) rationality of non-normative beliefs never influences (...) the rationality of desires and actions, and 3) there are no desire-based reasons. The main aim of the paper is to critically evaluate the plausibility of the latter three theses. (shrink)

Gilbert's kisceral argumentation is, roughly speaking, about arguing based on intuitions. In the forefront of such a (rhetorical) model are arguers and audiences, who resolve disagreements using kisceral arguments. Intuitions as reasons were more important in pre-modern law, when the law was not as explicit, precise, and determinate as today. Law influenced by religion or religious law was a typical example. In our much more secular modern era, intuitions are more or less subordinated to the (legal) logical mode of arguing. (...) However, in tough legal cases, when logic "runs out," it is values that decide them. Not surprisingly, neuroscience and cognitive psychology have shown a strong connection between values and intuition. (shrink)

This paper examines the social theory of Lester Frank Ward, one of the most significant representatives of early American social theory, with particular attention to his conception of the state, which can be described as Hegelian. The first part of the paper gives a brief overview of early American social theory: its basic features, the issues that were the focus of attention during this period in the development of sociology in the US, and its most significant representatives. The basic features (...) of Ward’s social theory are then presented and examined in more detail. It is pointed out that it is: conceptual and essentially based on the natural sciences; based on the distinction between pure and applied sociology; systematic; supportive of progressive and pro-social reforms. It was directed against the individualist tradition. His theory was based on the belief that the human mind can direct social progress and that the order based on social inequalities, which is a product of the laissez-faire doctrine, cannot guarantee freedom and prosperity. The fundamental institution capable of doing so is the state. Therefore, the central part of this paper is devoted to his conception of the state and makes a comparison with Hegel’s theory of the ethical state contained in Hegel’s philosophy of objective spirit – philosophy of law and philosophy of history. It concludes by pointing out that Ward’s theory indicated the general direction of development of social circumstances towards the era of collectivism, and was also atypical of American social theory in some of its features. (shrink)

The 2-c debate between the Greek Apologists and the pagan Graeco-Roman tradition is multifaceted and complex. Common ground can be found in the mutual commitment to reason as a reflection of the Logos: Reason, or the rationality embedded in things. Logos, in this picture, is participated in through a performance of reasoning whose reliability is presupposed in the discourses of both debating parties—contextualized here as the presupposition that the deliverances and activity of reason are reliable for uncovering reality. Presuppositions are (...) starting points and driving principles of inquiry, here designated as first principles. One presuppositional conflict between 2-c Greek Apologists, taking the apologetic works of Justin, Theophilus, Athenagoras, and the author of the Epistle to Diognetus as a sample, and the pagan tradition, taking Celsus as its 2-c culmination, is over how to justify the commitment to reason’s reliability in the above sense. My claim in this paper is twofold: first, that the pagan position is unable in principle to demonstrate the reliability of its own reasoning and that all such inquiry is circular: it is always a further question for the pagan why reasoning reveals reality. I propose that what would count as an answer to this challenge is a metaphysical ‘fit’ between human embodiment and reality. And second, that the Apologists avoid this unhappy conclusion by committing themselves to the embodiment of Reason in Jesus—that the embodied act of human reasoning reveals reality because Reason itself is embodied in the same way. The upshot is that unless the pagan abandons his position, he is trapped in a circular epistemology and cannot encounter the Christian witness on its own terms. (shrink)

ABSTRACT This paper analyzes the use of language in the construction of identity in the constitution of an anti-state group, which is a part of the sovereign citizen movement in Austria. The group, called ‘Staatenbund Österreich’, had been active for several years before the government charged them with high treason. The group believes that the government is illegitimate – an assumption which allows them to legitimize their behavior. The movement, which is spreading across the globe, has started in the US (...) in the 1970s, and yet, it is still impossible to estimate the actual danger they pose, even though they have been reported to become increasingly violent. The present paper investigates the constitution of the ‘Austrian Commonwealth’ in order to find out how they manage to create an identity for their group, how they legitimize themselves and their claims, and how their language use compares to other extremist groups. (shrink)

Which epistemic value is the standard according to which we ought to compare, assess and design institutional arrangements in terms of their epistemic properties? Two main options are agent development and attainment of truth. The options are presented through two authoritative contemporary accounts-agent development by Robert Talisse’s understanding in Democracy and Moral Conflict and attainment of truth by David Estlund’s treatment, most prominently in Democratic Authority: A Philosophical Framework. Both options are shown to be unsatisfactory because they are subject to (...) problematic risk of suboptimal epistemic state lock-in. The ability of the social epistemic system to revise suboptimal epistemic states is argued to be the best option for a comparative standard in institutional epistemology. (shrink)

"Divided chronologically into four volumes, The Philosophy of Knowledge: A History presents the history of one of Western philosophy's greatest challenges: understanding the nature of knowledge. Each volume follows conceptions of knowledge that have been proposed, defended, replaced, and proposed anew. Knowledge in Contemporary Philosophy covers discussions about scientific knowledge, social knowledge, and self-knowledge, along with attempts to understand knowledge naturalistically, contextually, and normatively. How did contemporary epistemology begin? What shape is it now in? What future seems to await it? (...) The past hundred or so years have included excitement, puzzlement, and apparent progress within epistemology. This volume conveys much of that philosophical ferment and energy."--Bloomsbury Publishing. (shrink)

This paper argues that Hesiod's Myth of the Golden Race (Op. 109-126) influenced Plato's Myth of the Cicadas from the Phaedrus (258e-259d). Among other parallels, Hesiod's Golden Race and Plato's Cicadas have a similar diet and a similar rapport with the gods, they die in a similar way and enjoy similar benefits after death. The paper further argues that Plato used the inherent ambiguity of the Golden Age myths to draw attention to the ambiguity of the Cicadas themselves, who bring (...) both benefits and rewards to humans, depending on their behavior. (shrink)

In §24 of the Transcendental Deduction, Kant remarks that his account of the capacity of the understanding to spontaneously determine sensibility explains how empirical self-knowledge is possible through inner-sense. Although most commentators consider Kant's conception of empirical self-knowledge through inner sense to be either a failure or at least drastically under-developed, I argue that (just as Kant claims) his account of the capacity of the understanding to determine sensibility - the "productive imagination" - can ground an attractive account of self-knowledge. (...) The account of inner sense I propose, however, may seem to conflict with some of Kant's views on time. I close the paper by arguing that the apparent conflict is not a fault specific to my account of inner sense, but rather indicative of a deeper tension, internal to Kant's views on time. (shrink)